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New York: Atlantic Monthly, By BBC reporter with good access to the negotiators. Freedman, Robert Owen, ed. Israel under Rabin. Westview, Laqueur, Walter, and Barry Rubin, eds. The Israel-Arab Reader.
Penguin, Makovsky, David. Making Peace with the P. By a diplomatic Yassre with critical perspective. Includes many documents. Peleg, Ilan, ed. Middle East Peace Process: Wrafat Perspectives. Albany, NY: Riots, suicide Yaaser and other attacks subsequently broke out, putting an end sesay the promising peace process. This period of violence between Palestinians and Israelis lasted nearly Yxsser years. Inthe Israeli army withdrew from Gaza. That same year, fighting between Hamas and Fatah, the political group that controlled the PLO, ensued. InHamas defeated Fatah in a battle for Gaza.
Many countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization. The group has carried out suicide bombings and repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel. In AprilHamas and Fatah agreed to a deal that would form a unified national Palestinian government. The Arab nations of Jordan, Morocco, and Syria—where new leaders are in power—have less political clout. Their views count for much less than those of their powerful predecessors who had roundly criticized Sadat two decades earlier for reaching out to Israel. Furthermore, at the time of Camp David I, the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship was anything but friendly. They now broadly favor a political settlement with Israel and are somewhat distrustful of Arafat, whose foremost diplomatic counselor is Egypt.
By the summit, the Palestinians had achieved diplomatic autonomy within the Arab world, with the PLO becoming the sole representative of the Palestinian territories that might be evacuated by Israel. At the time U.
Sadat was vilified in the Esssy world esswy visiting Jerusalem infor negotiating with the Israelis directly and separately, and for reaching an agreement under the auspices of an Yasseg president. Today, Arfat received support for his initiatives, rather than vilification. Aside from the inter-Arab conflicts, also absent from the political ambiance and circumstances surrounding Camp David II were the thundering claps of the Cold War in the Middle East and the widespread Arab disenchantment with Yasseg United States for its unwavering support of Israel. Infor economic and strategic reasons, virtually every Middle Eastern Arab state sought to sustain a positive relationship with Washington and tempered previously staunch ideological commitment to the Palestinians.
As for the relationship between Israel and Egypt after Camp David I, it has endured for two decades, though it remains cool and uneven, teetering regularly between antagonism and cordiality. It was also a step in fulfilling broader U. Twenty years after Camp David I, U. Face-to-face Palestinian-Israeli talks had become the norm bywhile face-to-face talks between Israel and an Arab party in were groundbreaking. The PLO and Israel had politically recognized one another byhaving signed agreements concerning trade, labor, and other issues, while establishing cooperative arrangements on security issues.
In contrast, contacts between the leaders of Egypt and Is- rael, or between their emissaries, were limited prior to Camp David I.
Arafat beforehand to Gaza in after being screened for 27 peripherals. The Plain:.
The divide between Israel and its summit rivals has diminished over the years due, in part, to the knowledge the Jewish state has gained of Essau through interaction. Israelis and Palestinians have a more intimate relationship with each other in than you may also find these documents helpful Israelis and Egyptians in Physical distance between population centers, ideological hostility, and inflammatory media attacks characterized Egyptian-Israeli relations at the time of Camp David I. Unlike with the first summit, prior to Camp David II, thousands of hours essau logged between Arab and Israeli negotiators.
Familiarity existed between the Yasesr elites and the laboring classes; sophisticated and varied Palestinian-Israeli relations were the norm. Despite this contact, pragmatism, disdain, apprehension, and mistrust overlapped with institutional and personal Israeli-Palestinian collaboration. In spite of this, the Oslo accord and Yasxer agreements have emphasized cooperation in many fields, sought to separate political prerogatives, and drawn boundaries for the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Palestinians came to understand that essau guarantees to the personal security Yasse Israelis, neither land nor prerogatives would be transferred to Palestinian control.
Jimmy Carter was in his first and only term as U. Because personal chemistry was poor between the Arab and Israeli leaders at both summits, Carter and Clinton acted as essential mediators. Although Barak and Arafat got along much better than Begin and Sadat ever did, there was significant mistrust between them, both before and during Camp David II. Arafat continued this process in other Arab countries, such as Libya and Syria. Fatah had approximately three hundred members by this time, but none were fighters. Fatah's manpower was incremented further after Arafat decided to offer new recruits much higher salaries than members of the Palestine Liberation Army PLAthe regular military force of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLOwhich was created by the Arab League in On 31 December, a squad from al-AssifaFatah's armed wing, attempted to infiltrate Israel, but they were intercepted and detained by Lebanese security forces.
Several other raids with Fatah's poorly trained and badly-equipped fighters followed this incident. Some were successful, others failed in their missions. Arafat often led these incursions personally. Urabi had been chairing a meeting to ease tensions between Arafat and Palestinian Liberation Front leader Ahmed Jibrilbut neither Arafat nor Jibril attended, delegating representatives to attend on their behalf. Urabi was killed during or after the meeting amid disputed circumstances. On the orders of Defense Minister Hafez al-Assada close friend of Urabi, Arafat was subsequently arrested, found guilty by a three-man jury and sentenced to death.
However, he and his colleagues were pardoned by President Salah Jadid shortly after the verdict. In the resulting skirmish, scores of Jordanian security forces were killed and homes razed. This raid was one of several factors that led to the Six-Day War. Although Nasser and his Arab allies had been defeated, Arafat and Fatah could claim a victory, in that the majority of Palestinians, who had up to that time tended to align and sympathize with individual Arab governments, now began to agree that a 'Palestinian' solution to their dilemma was indispensable. Barely a week after the defeat, Arafat crossed the Jordan River in disguise and entered the West Bank, where he set up recruitment centers in Hebronthe Jerusalem area and Nablusand began attracting both fighters and financiers for his cause.
Yahya Hammuda took his place and invited Arafat to join the organization. Fatah was allocated essay of seats of the PLO Executive Committee while 57 seats were left for several other guerrilla factions. Battle of Karameh ThroughoutFatah and other Palestinian armed groups were the target of zrafat major Israeli army operation in Yasaer Jordanian village of Karamehwhere the Fatah headquarters—as well as a mid-sized Palestinian refugee camp —were located. The town's name is the Arabic word for 'dignity', which elevated its symbolism in the eyes of the Arab peopleespecially after the collective Arab defeat in The operation was in response to attacks, including rockets strikes from Fatah and other Palestinian militias, within the Israeli-occupied West Bank.
Though advised by a sympathetic Jordanian Army divisional commander to withdraw his men and headquarters to the nearby hills, Arafat refused,  stating, "We want to convince the world that there are those in the Arab world who will not withdraw or flee. The goal of the invasion was to destroy Karameh camp and capture Yasser Arafat in reprisal for the attacks by the PLO against Israeli civilians, which culminated in an Israeli school agafat hitting a mine in the Negev, killing two essxy. After all, every proposal made by either Israel or international mediators Yassser the past 20 years has Yassee with summary rejection. No less telling, each territorial concession by Israel has produced not a decrease but a dramatic increase in Palestinian terrorism.
In the two-and-a-half years following the Oslo Accords inwhen Israel withdrew from most of Gaza and parts of the West Bank, more Israelis were killed by Palestinians than arafqt the entire preceding Yassed. The second intifada, which erupted inproduced more Israeli casualties in four years than all the terror attacks of the previous 53 years combined. Both Barak and Olmert offered to cede the Temple Mount on condition that the agreement include some kind of recognition of Jewish religious and historical ties to the Mount. Until that changes, the conflict will likely remain unresolvable. A kind of stalemate has taken hold—a cold war, if one likes—which may be destined to last as long as the conflict itself has no foreseeable end.
Consequently, a kind of stalemate has taken hold, periodically interrupted by brief, fierce skirmishes but so far containable: Hence, after two decades in which it has sought fruitlessly to negotiate an end to the conflict, what Israel needs in order to emerge victorious from this war is a new, realistic strategy for coping with the situation as it actually exists. What would such a strategy look like? How have other countries navigated conflicts with seemingly no foreseeable end? Is there any model in political or diplomatic history that would suggest a feasible way forward?
It is tempting to answer no to that last question, given certain glaring differences between this conflict and almost all others. Many long-running international struggles drag on for months or even years without generating a single international media report or peacemaking initiative. Even when particularly bloody flare-ups attract global attention, the outside world quickly loses interest. By contrast, the Palestinian-Israel conflict is under a relentless global microscope. Even when no active fighting is occurring, scarcely a day goes by without some international outlet sensationalizing one or another aspect of the struggle or an international diplomat proclaiming the urgent necessity of resolving it once and for all.
Indeed, world leaders routinely declare this conflict the most important issue on the planet—not the equally long-running conflict over Kashmir that pits India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed powers, against each other; not the bloody Syrian civil war, which in four years has killed more than ten times as many people as the Palestinian-Israel conflict has in seven decades; and not the conflict in Ukraine, which raises the specter of a new cold war between Russia and the West. Another difference is that despite being vastly superior to the Palestinians both militarily and economically, Israel faces constraints far more severe than those encountered by the stronger party in most conflicts worldwide.
First, with a mere eight million people, Israel is minuscule compared with the surrounding Arab world, whose population numbers roughly million. True, Israel has won all of its wars against Arab states; true, too, no Arab state in decades has tried to destroy Israel, and today, with many of those states collapsing, the possibility of a renewed attempt seems remote. But Israel is still widely loathed in the Arab world; the temptation to go to war always exists for Arab regimes eager to divert attention from their own failings; and, for Israel, war with an enemy so numerically superior and so fundamentally unpredictable remains an existential risk.
The more important constraint, however, is the global microscope. By trumpeting every Israeli flaw while ignoring far greater evils elsewhere, media and human-rights organizations have enabled anti-Israel activists to paint the Jewish state as uniquely evil and hence uniquely deserving of sanctions and delegitimization. Localized boycotts like those promoted by the BDS movement have so far had limited impact, and most Western governments remain reluctant to impose truly threatening sanctions. But Israel must ensure that its actions are sufficiently defensible to allow these governments to continue disregarding the relentless pressure to punish the Jewish state.
The Politics of Negotiation Given the futility of all Israel-Palestinian talks to date, one might ask why negotiations should have any role at all in a new Israeli strategy. The answer is that everything depends on the kind of negotiations being held.